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A WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT MAY BE GRANTED IN NEW YORK.
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-0-0-0-

Cornell University
School of Law.
1896.

This thesis treats of so much of the law pertaining
to the granting of a warrant of attachment of property as is
found in sections six hundred thirty-five and six hundred
thirty-six of the New York Code of Civil Procedure.
not,

therefore,

include

the granting of warrants

against. a public officer,

etc.,

for peculation,

in

It does
actions

which is

provided for in section six hundred thirty-seven of the Code
of Civil Procedure.

The plan followed has been to quote a

part of the section of the Code of Civil Procedure,

and under

that to treat of cases explanatory of the matter quoted.

Section 635:-

"A WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT AGAINST THE PROPERTY OF ONE
OR MORE DEFENDANTS IN AN ACTION MAY BE GRANTED UBON THE APPLICATION OF THE PLAINTIFF."

An attachment cannot be demanded

as a matter of right in a case in which it

is

authorized,

and whether in a particular case the warrant should issue is
within the discretion of the court.
N. Y. 341)

(Sartwell v. Field, 68

The discretion of the lower court may be reviewed

by the appellate division upon the merits,

re-

but an order,

fusing or vacating an order granting a warrant of attachment
is

not appealable to the Court of Appeals,

less the order shows that it
of power,

or unless it

lute legal right.

If

in any case,

un-

was refused or vacated for want

presents a question of law or an absothe order is

granted in a case not au-

thorized, or if there is an entire absence of facts justifying it, the case would present a question of law, and the order would be appealable.

(Allen v.

Meyer,

the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction,

73 N. Y. 1)

upon appeal,

question as to whether the property attached is
subject of attachment.

And

of a

legally the

(Dunlop v. The Patterson Fire Ins.

Co., 74 N. Y. 145)
"WHERE THE ACTION IS TO RECOVER A SUM OF MONEY ONLY".
It

is here to be observred,

that the warrant cannot be granted

in actions for equitable relief.
N. 5. 248; Thorington v. Merrick,
"AS DAMAGES."

(Ebner v. Bradford,

3 Abb.

Pr.

101 N. Y. 5)

The warrant cannot be granted for

nominal damages, even in a case authorized by the Code, as it

3

is not within the intent of the statute to allow it

for nomi-

(Walts v. Nichols, 32 Hun. 276) and at a Spec-

nal damages;

ial Term an attachment was vacated, where the amount of damages was largely conjectural. (White v. Goodson etc. Co.,
68 St. Rep. 719)
An at-

"FOR ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING CAUSES."

tachment cannot be granted in an action in which the complaint
sets forth several causes of action, upon some of which an
(Union Consolidated Mining

attachment could not be issued.
Co. v.

Raht,

9 Hun.

208)

"(I) BREACH OF CONTRACT, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OTHER THAN
A CONTRACT TO MARRY."

An action brought,

under section 3247

to recover the costs of all

of the Code of Civil Procedure,

former action, which was prosecuted by the present defendant
in the name of a third person,
is

for the defendant's benefit,

not an action upon contract express or implied,

meaning of this section.

(The Remington Paper Co.

erty, 32 Hun. 255, affirmed 99 N. Y. 673)
Paper Co.

v.

O'Dougherty,

supra,

it

imposed by provisions of a statute,

within the
v.

O'Dough-

In The Remington

was held that a liability
is

not an implied promise,

which was defined as an express promise proved by circumstantial

evidence.

This definition of an implied promise has not

been followed in subsequent cases.
v. Mayor etc.,

(108

N. Y. 276),

it

In Gutta Percha etc.

Co.

was said that "two kinds

of contracts are contemplated by section 635,

express con-

tracts, which are such as are voluntarily made by the parties thereto,

and implied contracts,

which,

though not express-

4
ly made by the parties,

are made by the law -hen

enfore-

acting upon

ing a sound morality and a wise public policy,
principles of equity and justice,

it,

imposes upon a party an obAnd it

ligation to pay a debt or discharge a duty."

was ac-

cordingly held that an action on a foreign judgment was an
The same conclusion was ar-

action on an implied contract.

(36 Hun.

rived at in Nazra v. McCalmont oil Co.,
correct rule undoubtedly is

that a judgment is

within the attachment law, but it
tract for all purposes.

a contract

not treated as a con-

is

(O'Brien v.

The

296).

Young,

95 N. Y. 428)

An

action by the United States for an unpaid duty, is an action
upon an implied contract (United States v.

Graff,

304); but an action upon a statute for a penalty,
(Wilson v.

Harvey,

52 How. Pr.

67 Barb.
is

otherwise.

126)

An allegation in the complaint,

in an action for

goods sold, that a sale was induced by fraudulent representations,

does not convert,

on contract,

into a tort action.

affects only the remedy.
"(2)
Weill v.

what would otherwise be an action
The allegation of fraud

(Whitney v.

Hirsh,

39 Hun.

326)

WRONGFUL CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY."
Malone (39 State Rep.

899),

Thus in

a warrant was granted in

an action brought for the conversion of certain steel.
"(3)

AN INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY,

IN CONSEQUENCE OF'

OR OTHER WRONGFUL ACT."

This sub-division

NEGLIGENCE,

FRAUD,

was amended in 1894,

prior to which it

read,

"An injury to

property" instead of "An injury to person or property" as at
present.

Injuries to person are defined by section 3343 subd.

5
"libel, slander,

9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to include

criminal conversation, seduction, and malicious prosecution;
also an assault,

battery,

false imprisonment,

or other action-

able injury to the person either of the plaintiff
The next sub-division (Subd.

12 of section 3343)

or another."
defines an

"injury to property" as "an actionable act, whereby the estate of another is lessened, other than a personal injury, or
a breach of a contract."
An attachment may be granted in an action to recovor damages for fraudulent representations,

for such repre-

sentations constitute an "injury to property" within sub.sivision 10 of section 3343 of the Code of-Civil Procedure.
(Campion

etc.

Co.

v.

Searing,

47 Hun.

has been induced to make advances

237)

And so one who

on the faith of forged pap-

er has sustained an injury to personal property,

and presents

a cause of action in which a warrant of attachment may issue.
(Bogart v. Dart, 25 Hun. 395)
It

is,

however,

to be observed,

that while a war-

rant of attachment may issue in an action to recover damages
for fraudulent misrepresentations,

that such misrepresenta-

tions are not a ground for the granting of a warrant of atm

tachment.

(Goldschmidt v. Hersohorn,

13

State Rep.

580)

6
Section 636:TO ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO SUCH A WARRANT, HE MUST
SHOW BY AFFIDAVIT, TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE JUDGE GRANTING
THE SAME."

A verified pleading is

regarded as an affidavit.

(subm-division ii, of section 3343 of the Code of Civil Procedure)

but

The affidavit need not be made by the plaintiff,

may be made by any person who is familiar with the facts.
(Edick v. Green, 38 Hun. 202)
It is always necessary that the application be
founded upon an affidavit containing the matters required to
be stated by section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to
give the court jurisdiction, and the omission of any of the
allegations required to be stated is not a mere irregularity
but a defect of jurisdiction which cannot be remedied by
amendment, and a warrant so obtained will be set aside.

(Zer-

egal v. Benoist, 33 How. Pr. 129; McVicker v. Campanini, 24
State Rep. 643)

But where the affidavit sets forth enough

facts to call upon the officer for the exercise of his judgment upon the weight and importance of the evidence stated it
is sufficient.

(Conklin v.

Dutcher, 5 How. Pr. 386)

To de-

feat his jurisdiction it must be made to appear that there is
a total want of evidence upon some material point.
(Schoonmaker v. Spencer, 54 N. Y. 366)

Allegations upon information and belief only, are
not sufficient, and do not give the court jurisdiction to
issue the warrant.
252)

(Steuben Co. Bank v. Alberger, 78 N. Y.

The sources of information and the grounds of belief

7
must be stated, so that the judicial officer to whom the affidavit

presented may judge whether the

is

information and
he is satisfied

belief have a proper basis to rest on; and if

is sufficient to invoke

that they have, then the affidavit

Abso-

jurisdiction and to be submitted to his determination.
lute certainty is
it

is

not expected;

the evidence

convincing and satisfactory;

all

is

that is

sufficient
required

if

is

that the information furnished by the affidavit shall be such
that a person of reasonable prudence would be willing to accept and act upon it.
Bennett v.

Edwards,

the plaintiff

(Buell v. Van Camp, 119 N. Y.

27 Hun.

352)

In

Buell v.

160;

Van Camp,

supra,

averred that the source of his information and

the grounds of his belief were the affidavits

of two persons

named, copies ofwhich were annexed,the original not being
obtainable,

and this was held to be sufficient.

But where

the sources of information were stated to be contained in
affidavits

on file

in

court,

portion of them stated,
Bros.

Co.

v.

it

but which were not quoted or any

was held insufficient.

Potter Produce Co.,

77 Hun.

313)

Where a person baving positive knowledge
facts refuses to make an affidavit,

(Selser

the applicant

of the
is

not ob-

liged to procure an order under section 885 of the Code of
Civil Procedure,

requiring him to appear before before a ref-

eree and submit to an examination; but the fact of such refusal may be stated,

together with the knowledge the person

is

and any affidavit made by such reluctant

known to possess,

witness,w showing the facts, if on file, may be quoted and

8
referred to.

(Bennett v.

Edwards,

27 Hun; 352)

But mere in-

convenience is not a sufficient reason for not producing the
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the
facts relied upon to make a case for the granting of the warrant.

(Brewster v. Van Camp, 28 St. Rep. 591)

complaint is

relied on as affidavit,

any portion of them,

If a verified

and the allegations,

are made upon information and belief, a

positive affidavit verifying its statements makes it

suffi-

cient evidence of the existence of a cause of action.
v.

Green,

38 Hun.

or

(Edick

202)

We have seen that when the affidavit is made upon
information and belief that it

is

necessary that the sources

of affiant's information and the grounds of his belief should
be stated, and it is, therefore, important to determine when
an affidavit sworn to positively by a person who is not shown
to be in ,a position to have personal knowledge of the subject,
is

presumed to have been made on personal knowledge and

thereforel sufficient,

and when he must state the sources of

his information and the grounds of his belief.
Statements in an affidavit will be presued to have
been made on personal knowledge unless stated to be made on
information and belief,

except where it

appears affirmatively

and by fair inference, that they could not have been,
not,

made on such knowledge,

(Crowns v. Vail,

51 Hun.

and were
204)

,

or that affiant did not necessarily have personal knowledge
of the facts.

(McVicker v.

Campanini,

24 State Rep.

643)

Stated in other words, the rule to be deduced from these cases

9
seems to be,

that where the affiant

transaction,

that there

not a party to the

is

no presumption that he has person-

is

al knowledge of the facts sworn to,

and he must therefore

show that he has personal knowledge of the facts,

or else

show such circumstances that will raise a presumption that he
(See upon this sub-

has.a personal knowledge of the facts.
Ball,

ject generally Buhl v.

41 Hun.

61,

at 64)

Thus far the rule seems to be well settled,
a considerable

there is

but
cir-

conflict of authority as to what

cumstances are sufficient to raise a presumption that the
This

facts are within the personal knowledge of the affiant.
is

so concerning affidavits made by the officers of a corpor-

ation.

Where the affidavit

of the plaintiff,

there is

is

made by the agent or attorney

no doubt but that it

must appear

that affiant had personal knowledge of the facts sworn to, or
that he had such relations to the business of his principal
as to justify the inference that he knows what he states.
(Buhl v.

Ball,

61)

41 Hun.

In

Crowns v.

it-was head - that where the affidavit
action of his client
ney of record,

is

in

Vail,

204),

respect to a trans-

made by one who is

that the plain inference

(51 Hun.

is

simply the attorthat such attorney

has not personal knowledge of the facts as to which he af firmed.

The allegations must be presumed not to be within the

knowledge

of the attorney,

and such being the case,

have been made upon information,
Campanini,

(24 State Rep.

643),

they must

and in the case of McVicker v.
where the affiant alleged

that he was the son of the plaintiff and had a knowledge of

I0
the facts, but did not show how he had acquired a knowledge
in respect to those facts, it was held not sufficient to infer a personal knowledge of the facts sworn to.
pointed out,

As before

in the case of affi-

the greatest conflict is

davits of the officers of a corporation.

Attention is

called

to two recent cases on this point decided by the General Term
of the First Department.

In Hodgman v. Barker, (60 Hun. 156),

the affiant was an officer,

cashier,

which was a banking corporation.
Mr.

Justice Van Brunt,

of the moving creditor,

In an opinion written by

the presiding Justice,

it

that the allegation of the cashier of the bank,

was decided
that certain

notes upon which money had been procured by the defendant
were forged,

was not sufficient,

as it

was not a plain in-

ference that the affiant had any personal knowledge of the
facts,

and it

was not shown affirmatively that he had.

the next term of the same court,

At

held a month later, Mr.

Justice Van Brunt wrote another opinion, in which he applied
the same rule to the affidavit of the President of the corporation, which was the moving creditor.

That the fact that

deponent was President of the moving creditor would not justify the inferencei of knowledge.

His associates did not con-

cur in this, but wrote opinions in which they held,

that the

President's position as chief executive officer of the company,

justified the inference that when he swears positively

with regard to a corporate transaction he speaks of his own
personal knowledge.

But this is

true only when it

appears

that deponent was President at the time that the transaction

11
(Manufacturers'

out of which the claim arose, took place,.
National Bank v.

60 Hun.

Hall,

cashier of a bank,

it

And in

466)

the case of the

has been held that because of his posi-

tion he is presumed to be acquainted with the financial affairs of the corporation
nal Park Bank v.
flicting

of which he is

Whitmore,

40 Hun.

Nat.

case of Manufacturers'

Bank,

v.

(Natio-

There are other con-

499)

but it

cases upon this point,

an officer.

is

Hall,

submitted that the
supra,

lays down

the correct rule.
But where the affiant does not necessarily have
knowledge of ar cannot be presumed to know the several facts
stated in his affidavit, it will be sufficient

if he states

facts which tend to show that he has personal knowledge of
the facts required to be stated.
State Rep.

643)

Thus where it

the agent of the plaintiff,

(McVicker v.

Oampanini,

24

appears that the affiant was

and that he had personally sold

and delivered to the defendant the goods, to recover the price
of which the action was brought, and that the plaintiffs were
themselves in
action,

it

no manner personally consected with the trans-

was held a statement

of such facts as would show a

personal knowledge of the contents

bon v.

Back,

35 Hun.

But it

of the affidavit.

(Grib-

541)

should be remembered that while it

has been

shown that where the affiant will not be presumed to have a
personal knowledge of the facts to which he swears,
affidavit is

and the

therefore treated as though made upon informa-

tion and belief,

that by showing the sources of the

informa-

12
the affidavit will never-

tion and the grounds of the belief,
theless be sufficient.

"THAT OTTE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION SPECIFIED IN THE
IF THE ACTION IS

LAST SECTION EXISTS AGAINST THE DEFERDANT.
TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT."
the action is

It

is

only when

to recover damages for breach of contract,

press or implied,

ex-

that the plaintiff must show the facts re-

quired by sub-division I of section 636, except that the requirement "that one of the causes of action specified in the
last section exists against the defendant" must be complied
with in every case.

(Campion etc.

Co.

v.

Searing,

47 Hun.

237)
"THE AFFIDAVIT MUST SHOW THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER."

It must appear either expressly or by

fair inference that the debt which the action was brought to
recover is due.

(Reilly v.

Sisson,

31 Hun.

573; Smadbeck v.

Sisson,. id. 582)
"A SUM STATED THEREIN."

It must appear that the

plaintiff is entitled to recover a particular sum, which is
specified.

A general averment of damages is

(Golden etc.
sufficient
titled

Co.
if

Jackson,

13 Abb.

N.

C. 476)

Nor is

the affidavit states that the plaintiff

it

is

to recover the sum of $10,000.00 or a larger sum,

and above all
N.

v.

not sufficient.

counter-claims.

(Thorington v.

Merrick,

enover

101

Y. 5)
"OVER AID ABOVE ALL C0UNTER-CLAIMS."

essarythat

It

is

not nec-

the affidavit should state the precise words used

13
in the Code,

if

It

equivalent words be used.

is

sufficient

if. the affidavit furnishes evidence from which the Judge who
grants the warrant may be lawfully satisfied of the truth of
the facts required to be shown,
dence.

but there must be some evi-

The statament "over and above all discounts and set-

offs" is

equivalent to "over and above all counterclaims."

(Lamkin v. Douglass,
defendant

is

27 Hun.

517)

But an averment that "the
and

indebted to the plaintiff in a sum stated",

that the latter "is

justly entitled to recover said sum",

not a'sufficient compliance with the Code,

as it

is

does not

follow that the defendant has not, to the knowledge of the
plaintiff, a counterclaim.
"KNOV

TO HIM."

(Ruppert v.

Haug,

87 N. Y.

141)

This phrase refers to the plaintiff,

and when the affidavit is not made by the plaintiff, the
question arises, how can the affiant swear to such knowledge
by the plaintiff.

There is a large number of cases on this

point,. and they will not be reviewed here,

as it

is submitted

that the conclusions deduced from them by Bishop,
"Code Practice in Personal Actions",

in his

are correct.

These con-

clusions are as follows:"1st

If the affidavit is made by an agent, and he swears
to knowledge of the plaintiff, since this must necessarily be
upon information and belief, he must state the sources of
such information and belief or the affidavit will be insufficient."
"2d

If

the affidavit is made by an agent,

it

will not

belenough for him to swear to a sum due over and above all

14
The

counterclaims known to him; he is not the plaintiff.
defect is

held to be jurisdictional."
When an agent makes the affidavit,

"3d

and it

that the transaction was within his own knowledge,
davit that the sum is
known to the plaintiff

his affi-

counterclaims

will be accepted."

When the plaintiff is a corporation and the affi-

"4th
davit is

due over and above all

appears

made by an officer of the corporation,

enough must

appear respecting his position and duties to create an inference that he knew the condition of the transactions between
the plaintiff

and the defendant.

of a bank."

As in

(Bishop's Code Practice

the case of a cashier

in.Personal Actions,

p .244)
"THAT THE DEFENDANT IS EITHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION."
Togive the court jurisdiction to grant an attachment against
a foreign corporation,

the affidavit

in

addition to setting

forth a cause of-action for which an attachment may be granted must show that the action could be maintained against the
foreign corporation.
State Rep.

542)

(Oliver v.

This is

of Civil Procedure,

Walter Heywood Chair Co.,

regulated by section 1780 of the Code

which provides

a resident of the State,

that,

if

the plaintiff

or a domestic corporation,

may be maintained for any cause of action.
tiff

32

But if

an action
the plain-

be a non-resident or another foreign corporation,

action can be maintained only where the action is

be

an

brought to

recover damages for breach of a contract made within the

State,

or relating to property situated within the State at

15
the time of the making thereof; or where the cause of action
arose within the State; except where the object of the action
is to effect the title to real property situated without the
State.

The causes of action mentioned in sub-division second

of this section are not enumerated here, as they are not
actions in which a warrant may be granted.
It is enough to aver affirmatively that the defendant is a foreign corporation, stating the statecountry or
government by or under whose laws created, (Section 1775 of
the Code of Civil Procedure ), but an allegation that the
above named defendant "is or holds itself out to be a foreign
corporation" is an allegation in the alternative and. not
sufficient.

(Shanks v. Magnolia Metal Co., 89 N. Y.486)

Section 5798 of U. S. R. S., the National Banking
Act- authorizing suits against banking associations organized
under it, to be brought in the court of the county or city of
the State in which the association is located, is permissive,
not mandatory, and does not have the effect of depriving the
other courts of Jurisdiction.

And section 5242 of said act,

prohibiting the issuing of an attachment against such an
association or its property before final judgment, applies
only to an association which has become insolvent or to one
about to become so, as specified in that section.

A Judge,

therefore, has jurisdiction to issue a warrant of attachment
in an action against a national bank.
81 N. Y.

385)

(Robinson v. Nat. Bank,

But the attachment must be vacated if the bank

afterwardsbecomes

insolvent&

(National etc.

Bank v.

Mechan-

16
ies Nat. Bank, 89 N. Y. 467)
"OR NOT A RESIDENT OF THE STATE."

It is important

under this sub-division to observe the distinction between
residence and domicil, for an attachment on the ground of nonresidence may be granted, even although the defendant still
has his domicil in this state.

(Mayor v. Genet, 4 Hun. 487;

Residence means a fixed or permanent

affirmed, 63 N. Y. 646)

abode or dwelling place for the time being, as contra-distinguished from a temporary locality of existence.

(Matter of

Wrigley, 8 Wend. 134; Bell v. Pierce, 51 N. Y. 12)
means something more than residence.

Domicil

It means an intention

to remain in a particular place as one's home.

A person may

have his domicil in one state, and at the same time reside in
another,

(Mayor v. Genet, supra); and so while a person can

have but one domicil, it is certain that he may have two residences, and such is the case of every person who has a townhouse and a country-seat, in each of which he dwells at different seasons of the year, with the intention of making each
his permanent abode for a limited period.
19 Wend. 11)

(Frost v. Brisbin,

Actual cessation to dwell within the state for

an uncertain period, without definite intention as to any

fixed time of returning, even though a general intention to
return at some future time exists, constitutes non-residence.
(Weitkamp v. Loehr, 53 Super. Ct. 79)

One who though domi-

ciled in this State, is living in another, with no abode here
nor any place, which he could caLl his home or to which he
could return on coming into the state,
0

is

a non-resident.

17

(Wood v. Hamilton,

And where a defendant after

14 Daly 41)

and after most stren-

conviction and before sentence excaped,

was

uous efforts to discover his whereabouts were futilD , it

held as the natural impulse promoting his escape would be at
once to place himself out of the limits of the state of conthat he would be presumed to have accomplished this

viction,

as soon as the circumstances would allow it

And

to be done.

that the same reason which prompted his escape,

would keep

him from returning and would induce him to continue his residence abroad indefinitely,
dent.

(Mayor v.
S

.

Genet,

and, he is

therefore a non-resl-

supra)

The fact that a resident of another state has a

place of business here does not constitute him a resident of
the State within the attachment law.
N. Y. 370)

(Wallace v.

Castle,

68

And one who maintains his family in,- another

state, and frequently resorts to his home with them there,
may be deemed a non-resident of the State within the attachment laws,

notwithstanding he has furnished appartments

in-

connection with his place of business in this State and there
lodges and takes his meals.
N. S.

(Murphy v.

Baldwin, 11 Abb.

Pr.

407)
The averment of the fact of non-residence

affidavit for attachment is

sufficient.

to state. facts tending to support this.

It

is

in the

not necessary

(Mvayor v.

Genet,

sup ra)
*

"IF1HE IS A NATURAL PERSON AI)

A RESIDENT OF THE

STATE, THAT HE HAS DEPARTED THEREFROM WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD

18
HISV CREDITORS, OR TO AVOID THE SERVICE OF A SUMMONS, OR KEEPS

HIMSELF CONCEALED THEREIN WITH LIKE INTENT."

It must appear

that the defendant has departed with intent to defraud his
or to avoid the service

creditors,

of a summons; and

not necessary that the departure be secret.
3 Week.

Dig.

332; Morgan v.

Avery,

7 Barb.

it

is

(Hertz v. Stuart,
656)

Where the application for anatachment

is

on the

ground that defendant has. kept himself concealed withv intent
to avoid the service of a summons,

it

is

not sufficient to

show that defendant could not be found at his place of business,

although an attempt was made to find him there on sevThe purpose to accomplish a concealment with

eral occasions.

intent to avoid 6the service of a summons must be clearly and
positively shown..
sufficient.

Conjecture,

surmise and suspicion are not

The proofs shouldkbe of such a chaTacter as to

fairly justify no other construction,
on the part of the defendant.
The affidavits
sufficient,

in

(Head v.

Head v..Wollner,

and dishonest purposes
Wollner,

supra,

53 Hun.

615)

which were held in-

were to the effect that the deponent on several

occasions went to- the place

of business of defendant and could

not find him; that he telephoned to such place of business;
that the voice which answered,
that of the defendant,
another voice replied.
the same action,

the deponent thought to be

but when he stated who had called,
A deponent in another affidavit in

alleged upon information and belief,

that

the.defendant kept himself concealed to avoid the service

of
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a summons upon him.
But slight circumstances are sufficient to establish that the intent with which the departure was made, was
to defraud creditors or avoid the service of a sunons.

No

required to worry itself to find excuses for a fugi-

court is

The question of insolvency,

tive from debt.
importance,

is

not controlling.

although of great

If a perfectly solvent man

departs from the State with intent to defraud his creditors
or avoid the service of process,
ed.

(Schoonmaker v. Spencer,
Where it

his property may be attach-

54 N. Y. 366)

appeared that the defendant is

absent from

his usual residence and place qof business during business
hours, when he is

about to fail, and soon after a demand hasand he refused to reveal his

been made upon him for a debt,

place of resort, it was held to sufficiently appear that defendant kept himself concealed to avoid the service of a summons. (Easton v. Malavazi, 7 Daly 147; Genin v. Tompkins, 12
Barb.

265)

In the last case cited the concealment was for

only nine hours,

and it

was held that the length of timerdur-

ing which the defendant kept himself concealed,
erial,

if

the intent appear.
In Buell v. Van Camp,

(28 St. Rep.

was not mat-e

907),

it

appear-

ed that the defendant had gone away without the knowledge of
his neighbors; that his wife had received a letter from him
which caused her much grief,
Canada;

it

and that she said he had gone to

also appeared that defendant had been called upon

in anotherproceeding to account as executor.

These circum-
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stances were held to make out a case tending to show that the
defendant had left the

State with intent to defraud his cre-

ditors or to avoid the service of a summons.
It

is

if

not tufficient

defendant keeps himself

concealed to avoid the service of criminal process.
Montgomery,

15 Wend.

(Lynde v.

461)

It need not appear whether the defendant has left
concealed within it,

the State,

or is

that he is

not in

and circumstances
that

the intent

upon him,

if

is

made to appear

his usual resort and cannot be discovered,
are shown from which it

is

can be inferred

either to avoid the service of a summons

or to defraud his creditors.

the statute are satisfied.
ternative.

it

The requirements

The case may be stated in

of

the al-

It-may be stated that the-defendant has departed

from the State,

or keeps himself concealed therein,

and that

the intent of the debtor was to defraud his creditors, or to
avoid the service of a summons.

(Van Alstyne v. Erwine, 11

N. Y.e331)
The facts must show that the defendants against
whom the process is

sought,

have done the acts;

the fact that

one partner has absconded will not entitle the plaintiff to a
warrant of attachment against the property of the firm, unless it
intent.

appears that all have absconded,
(Bogart v. Dart,

25 Hun.

395)

with the required
Proof that one of the

partners ;has absconded will entitle the plaintiff to an attachment against the property of that one.
Sevezey,';25,Hun. 85)

(Buckingham v.

21
"IF THE DEFENDANT IS A NATURAL PERSON OR A DOMESTIC
OR IS ABOUT TO REMOVE

THAT HE OR IT HAS REMOVED,

CORPORATION,

WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD HIS OR ITS

PROPERTY FROM THE STATE,

OR IS ABOUT

DISPOSED OR SECRETED,

CREDITORS;

OR HAS ASSIGNED,

TO ASSIGN,

DISPOSE OR SECRETE PROPERTY WITH THE LIKE
applying for an attachment

A plaintiff

under this sub-diviand where

called upon to act with promptness;

sion is

INTENT."

the

fraudulent disposition occurred several years before an action
must show a satisfactory

brought,

very clear case of fraud,
ed.

(Allen v.

before an attachment will be grant-

Herschorn,'9 Abb. Pr. N. S.

The property which is

removed or secreted must be

of the property of the plaintiff
intent to defraud that person,
Dash,

an assignment,

60 How.

80)

the fact that defendant has disposed

that of the defendant;

Bank v.

excuse for his delay or a

Pr.

124)

or of a third person with
is

(German

not sufficient,

and it

not enough to show

is

own pro-

disposal or secretion of plaintiff's

perty by defendant,

and further allege that by that act de-

fendant converted the prpperty so that it

became his own,

since the title
remained in the plaintiff
until he waived the
tort
by bringing suit on contract.
(Empire Warehouse Co. v.

Mallett,

84 Hun.
Nor is

or is

561)
it

necessary that the defendant has disposed

about to dispose,

of all his property;

of a part of his property (Hyman V. Kapp,
or of any property in
title,

if

he disposes

22 Week.

Dig.

310),

his possession and to which he claims

although his title

is

imperfect

or bad,

(Treadwell v.

22
Lawlor, 15 How. Pr. 8),

it is sufficient.

And it is immater-

ial where the fraudulent disposition takes place so long as
the court in this State has jurisdiction of the parties.
(Kibbe v. Wetmore, 31 Hun. 424)
In this sub-division, as under the last, it is necessary that the intent should appear, and facts showing intent must be stated.

(Hertz v. Stuart, 3 Week. Dig. 332;

Fleitmann v. Seckle, 13 State Rep. 399)
must be an actual fraudulent.motive,

The intent shown

and acts. from which the

law infers an intent to defraud, irrespective of actual
motive, or which are said to be constructively-,fraudulent,
are not sufficient.

Thus a general assignment which confers,,

upon the assignee the power to sell the.assigned property on
credit, is constructively fraudulent, as the law infers an

intent to work a fraud on creditors. even although the assignor entertained no fraudulent motiveo and will be set akide,,
but the insertion of the power to sell on creditt would -be-no
ground for the granting of a warrant of attachment, as there
was no actual fraudulent intent, but merely a constructive
fraud, or fraud in law. The fraudulent intent under this
section involves an actual motive to defraud, and not merely
a constructive intent inferred by the law from an act which
in itself may be consistent with an honest purpose. (Milliken
v. Dart, 26 Hun. 24; Citizens' Bank v. Williams, 128 N. Y.
77)

It should be remembered that a person is presumed to

have intended the natural consequences of his own act, and if
his acts have a necessary tendency to defraud,

the intent

23
will be presumed.
Fraud assumes so great a variety of forms, that no
classification of the cases can be given here.

Insolvency,

secrecy, unusual haste, transfers to near relatives on the
eve of failure, deceptions and falsehoods, are circumstances
which often accompany or characterize a fraudulent intent.
It is to be noticed, that here, as in other cases,
a statement in the disjunctive is proper, where the facts
stated show that the case falls under one or the other of the
two classes, and so an affidavit which averred that money had
"been disposed of by said defendant with intent to defraud
these plaintiffs or is concealed by him with like intent" was
held sufficient.

(Arming v. Monteverde, 8 St. Rep..812)

"WHERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROCURING CREDIT, OR THE EXTEN*.
S ION OF CREDIT, THE DEFENDANT HAS MADE A FALSE STATEMENT IN
WRITING,

UNDER HIS OWN HAND OR SIGNATURE, OR UNDER THE HAND

OR SIGNATURE OF A DULY AUTHORIZED AGENT,
LEDGE, AND ACQUIESCENCE,
OR STANDING."

MADE WITH HIS KNOW-

AS TO HIS FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

This sub-division is a recent amendment, it

taking effect September 1st, 1894.
"WHERE THE DEFENDANT BEING AN ADULT AND A RESIDENT
OF THE STATE, HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES

FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS NEXT BEFORE THE GRANTING OF THE ORDER OF PUBLICATION OF THE SUMMO0NS AGAINST HIM, AND HAS NOT
MADE A DESIGNATION OF A PERSON UPON WHOM TO SERVE A SUMMONS
IN HIS BEHALF, AS PRESCRIBED IN SECTION FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY OF THIS ACT; OR A DESIGNATION SO MADE NO LONGER REMAINS IN

24
FORCE; OR SERVICE UPON THE PERSON SO DESIGNATED CANNOT BE
MADE WITHIN THE STATE, AFTER DILIGENT EFFORT."

This sub-

division is

1895.

new,

and took effect September 1st,
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